An empirical investigation of the determinants of the location of foreign direct investment in the Central and Eastern European countries using multilevel data by Simona Rasciute (7195568) et al.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
       
ISSN 1750-4171 
 
        
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
  
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of 
the Location of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries Using 
Multilevel Data 
 
 
Simona Rasciute 
Eric J. Pentecost 
Helena I. Marques 
 
 
WP 2007 - 22 
 
 
 
 
 
Dept Economics 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough  
LE11 3TU  United Kingdom 
Tel:  + 44 (0) 1509 222701 
Fax: + 44 (0) 1509 223910 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec 
           
 
  
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of the 
Location of Foreign Direct Investment in the Central and 
Eastern European Countries Using Multilevel Data 
 
by 
 
Simona Rasciute, Eric J. Pentecost and Helena Marques 
Department of Economics 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough  
Leicestershire 
LE11 3TU 
UK 
 
 
September 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Eric Pentecost, Department of Economics, Loughborough 
University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK. Tel: +44-1509-222734; Fax: 
+44-1509-222310; Email E.J.Pentecost@lboro.ac.uk 
 
 2
  
An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Central and Eastern European Countries Using Multilevel Data  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper employs a novel multi-level data set and a multinomial logit model - to 
examine the factors explaining 1,223 foreign investment location decisions by firms in 
the EU(15), Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and the US in 12 Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs). The highly significant empirical results, based on a general 
underlying model of imperfect competition, show that the responsiveness of foreign 
direct investment in the CEECs to country-level variables differs significantly both across 
sectors and across firms of different sizes and profitability. In particular, in addition to the 
traditional importance of market size and distance, firm size and the effective corporate 
tax rate are also important for the location of investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing empirical literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has tended to focus either on macroeconomic (i.e. country) characteristics or 
microeconomic (i.e. firm and industry) characteristics. The traditional approach to the 
determinants of FDI was to take a macroeconomic perspective such that the location of 
FDI was based on portfolio theory (see for example, Ailber, 1970; Prachowny, 1972) or 
investment theory, where market size or growth were of fundamental importance 
(Boatwright and Renton, 1975; Kwack, 1972). More recent extensions of this 
macroeconomic approach have been to emphasise the role of wage rates or wage 
differentials (Culem, 1988; Goldsbrough, 1979) or the role of FDI in establishing export 
platforms (Barrell and Pain, 1996) or as a way of avoiding exchange rate fluctuations 
(Barrell and Pain, 1996; Cushman, 1985).  
A second distinct strand of the FDI literature has come from the intersection 
between industrial organisation theory and trade theory especially with introduction of 
scale economies, imperfect competition and product differentiation (see Markusen and 
Svensson, 1985). This approach is primarily microeconomic in nature and has 
emphasised the role of firm or industry-level attributes as determinants of FDI, although 
more recently, agglomeration economies have also been considered important for FDI 
decisions (Krugman, 1991). Locating close to other firms results in two counteracting 
effects: technological and pecuniary externalities and competition among the firms in the 
market. There is no consensus in the literature as to which force is stronger. Firms may 
prefer to enter the market that already has a large pool of workers and firms, even if they 
forgo some monopoly power (Amiti and Pissarides, 2005). Allowing MNEs to enter 
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foreign markets and to establish plants, however, increases the demand and the price for 
capital in that country, reducing factor price differences and the tendency towards 
agglomeration (Markusen and Venables, 2000). Furthermore, agglomeration economies 
can have a different effect on heterogeneous firms. Firms with the best technologies, 
human capital, suppliers and distributors will have little motivation to cluster 
geographically, as their technologies, human capital, suppliers and distributors will spill 
over to competitors, and only firms with the weakest technologies, human capital, 
suppliers and distributors will be willing to cluster (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). 
Agglomeration effects are also important as are multiple sites to hedge against risk 
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992). These kinds of models are difficult to test empirically 
because they require extensive amounts of firm-level data, therefore the approach has 
typically been to calibrate the model, by assuming some parameter values, and to attempt 
some numerical simulations (see for example, Markusen and Venables, 1998) Barrios et 
al., 2004 use panel data set on Greek, Irish and Spanish FDI productivity spillover from a 
firm level data set.  
An alternative empirical approach for these microeconomics-based models has 
been the use of a discrete choice methodology following Carlton (1983) and McFadden 
(1974), whereby the location choice of foreign investors, mostly in manufacturing, using 
discrete choice methodology (see for example,; Becker et al., 2004; Disdier and Mayer, 
2004; Guimaraes et al., 2000; and Head et al., 1999). 
Since the existing literature has found both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
determinants of FDI to be relevant, this paper generalizes this literature by allowing the 
FDI decision to depend on both to country (macroeconomic conditions) and firm or 
 5
  
industry characteristics. In addition this paper also derives a measure of the effective 
corporate tax rates in the relevant host countries, which is found to have a significant 
effect on the investment location decision. To this end this paper uses a discrete choice 
methodology and a multi-level data set. This is in contrast to the traditional ordinary least 
squares (OLS) time series or panel data techniques where the explanation of t4h size of 
investment at the country level by industry and firm level variable is limited. The 
methodology is applied to the location choices of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions of firms in the EU(15), Norway, Switzerland and the US into 12 Central 
Eastern and European Countries (CEECs), by using a multi-level data set – that is a data 
on countries, industries and firms - to simultaneously estimate the extent to which these 
different level factors determine the location choices of the foreign direct investment.  
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out the model of location 
choice, from both a statistical and economics perspective in particular, drawing on the 
results of the new trade theory and theories of imperfect competition. Section 3 discusses 
the data set and explains the construction of the variables that are used in the estimated 
model to explain the choice of investment location. Section 4 reports the estimation 
results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Location Choice Model  
2.1 The statistical model 
A foreign firm, i , is faced with the choice of locating its investment in a particular 
Central and Eastern European country (CEEC), , from a set of  CEECs, according to 
the expected level of profit (
c C
cisπ ) to be earned in that location in sector (industry), , is: s
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 cisciscis z εβπ +′=         (1) 
where  is a vector of country and industry characteristics for the firm which determine 
the level of profit, 
cisz
β ′  is a vector of parameters and cisε  is an error term. If the firm 
chooses country c it is assumed that cisπ  is the maximum among the C alternative 
locations. Therefore the statistical model is driven by the probability that country c is 
chosen because 
 )Pr( kiscis ππ >         (2) 
where k is any other location and ck ≠ . Following McFadden (1974), if and only if the 
 country disturbances C cisε  are independent and identically distributed with a Weibull 
distribution, such that  
          (3) ciseF cis
εε −=)(
where e  is the exponential constant, then  
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      (4) 
is the probability of investment in country c, which is referred to as the multinomial logit 
model (MNL). 
 From equation (1) profit depends on the set of factors in the matrix . However, 
 includes three sets of variables, country-specific variables, sector-specific variables 
and firm-specific variables. Let  be the attributes of the choices, which vary across the 
cisz
cisz
cx
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countries, but which are the same for both industries and firms. The second set of factors 
that are common between investing firms, but which vary across locations and sectors, 
are defined as . A third set of influences that are common between industries, but 
which vary across investing firms and countries are called 
csv
ciφ . Therefore the matrix  
can be partitioned as 
cisz
],,[ cicsccis vxz φ= .  
Due to the generic nature of firm- and industry-level variables, they have to be 
interacted with country-level variables in order to introduce variation across the 
alternatives. Furthermore some firm and industry-specific characteristics on their own 
cannot explain the location choices and they have to be combined with other factors. The 
specification of these interaction terms is considered in the next section. The final MNL 
is estimated using maximum likelihood where the log-likelihood function is: 
      (5) )Pr(loglog
1 1 1
cnL
I
i
C
c
S
s
cis∑∑∑
= = =
=
where  denotes the number of investments carried out by firm i, in sector s and in 
country c.  
cisn
 
2.2 The profit model 
From (1) the economic factors that determine the level of profit need to be specified. The 
after-tax profit in each location is defined as total revenue (TR) less total costs (TC) net of 
tax and less the costs arising from the institutional, legal, political and macroeconomic 
environment prevalent in the host country. It can be written as: 
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cciscis
cd
ciscis
ccis GQTC
QPT −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= )()1( τπ      (6)  
where  is the tax rate in location c, so that total profits are defined to be net of tax and 
where is the price received by firm i in country c and industry s from selling 
output , and  are the costs of producing . Output not only includes the 
quantity produced for sale in the home country, but also for export to foreign markets. 
The more liberal the trade regime of the country, the more it will be able to export abroad 
and the larger will be the quantity Q
cT
cisP
cisQ cisTC cisQ
cis. As a result, the so called “openness” of the 
country will have a positive effect on Qcis. 
“Iceberg” type transport costs τcd, are assumed between the source country d and 
host country c (Samuelson, 1954). For example, when goods are shipped from country d 
to country c, only a fraction 1/τdc of the original unit is assumed to arrive ( 1>cdτ ). 
Hence, other things being equal, the more remote locations are at a disadvantage. Finally, 
 is a term that captures the costs that firms incur due to the macroeconomic investment 
environment prevalent in the host countries. 
cG
Whilst TR is straightforward (prices adjusted for transport costs times quantity), 
the TC function requires more careful specification. The minimum total costs in each 
location are made up of fixed and variable costs, which following the new trade theory 
can be specified as:1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )icsicscucsicsscsicsics QcrwfwQTC βαβα −−−= 1     (7) 
                                                 
1 This is a standard formulation following Krugman (1991), where the total minimum cost is derived from a 
standard cost minimization problem assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
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where wcss is an hourly wage rate of skilled labour in country c and industry s; wcsu is an 
hourly wage rate of unskilled labour in country c and industry s, rc is a return on capital in 
country c and the α  and β  parameters are the shares of skilled and unskilled labour in 
total cost respectively. The first term on the right hand side of (7) represents the fixed 
costs, so a firm that locates its capital in country c and industry s incurs fixed cost fics, of 
acquiring information about foreign markets, developing appropriate marketing strategies 
and building distribution networks (Bernard et al., 2004). It is also assumed that skilled 
labour is allocated to fixed costs (reflecting costs of R&D), while capital and unskilled 
labour are allocated to variable costs (capturing standard production). The relative 
intensity of factor use varies across industries. MNEs enterprises use foreign capital in 
the form of foreign direct investment and domestic skilled and unskilled labour, Ls and Lu 
respectively. 
Substituting (7) into (6) we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ciscissicsccisciscuics
cd
cis
ccis GfwTQcrw
P
T −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −− αβαβτπ 11
1*
 (8) 
This specification of the profit function, in contrast to the majority of the current 
theoretical and empirical literature on FDI, allows for the assumption of homogeneity of 
firms in different sectors and different countries to be relaxed. This is important, as 
particular location advantages do not have the same value for all multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). For example, firms operating in different sectors and firms of different size and 
profitability benefit from local resources to different degrees. Location advantages vary 
for MNEs with different characteristics and therefore, the interaction between location 
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and firm together with industry attributes, rather than each of the firm and industry 
factors independently affects location choices. 
For a given set of prices, the attributes of the matrix of FDI determinants can 
be summarised as follows: 
cisz
 ( )cisccccdccis wGQrTzz ,,,, τ=       (9) 
where the first five terms are location-specific variables, while the last variable  
varies across both countries and industries.  
cisw
 
3. The Data Set and the Variable Specification  
Table 1 gives a summary of variable definitions and sources. There are 1,223 firm-level 
data observations on FDI flows from firms of 20 market economies (EU15 countries, 
USA, Japan, Russia, Norway and Switzerland) to the firms in 12 transition economies 
(the ten new EU member states (except for Malta and Cyprus) plus Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania and Ukraine) from 1997 to 2003. The dependent variable in the MNL is 
arranged to take a value of one for the chosen alternatives and zero for the rest of the 
alternatives that an investing firm faces. The dependent variable is a discrete choice 
indicator of the country in which the investment is made.  
The country-specific determinants of FDI into the CEECs can be loosely divided 
into the traditional determinants and the transition-specific determinants. The transition-
specific determinants are proxied by the risk associated with each host country, , in 
equation (9). The institutional, legal and political environment, i.e. transparency and 
effectiveness of legal system, are important for the decision of foreign investors to locate 
their capital abroad. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TICP) 
cG
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is used as a measure of the extent of corrupt practices in the host country. This index 
pools information from ten different surveys of business executives, risk analysis and the 
general public. The TICP index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which 
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians and it varies from 1 
(high corruption) to 10 (no corruption)2.. 
The traditional determinants from equation (10) are the market size of the host 
country, Qc, the rate of return in the host country, , distance τcr cd, and tax rates  in the 
host country. As Table 1 shows, market size is simply the GDP of the country and the 
rate of return is measured as the long-term return on government bonds. Market access in 
the investment receiving country does not only depend on market size in the host country, 
but also on the opportunity to export production to neighbouring countries. As a result 
foreign investors prefer countries with liberal trade regimes. In order to take this effect 
into account, the investment receiving country’s exports as a percent age of GDP is also 
included in the estimated model, with the sign of the parameter on OPEN expected to be 
positive.  
cT
Distance can be considered as a measure of the transaction costs of undertaking 
foreign activities, such as the costs of transport and communications, the costs of dealing 
with cultural and language differences, the costs of sending personnel abroad, and the 
informational costs of institutional and legal factors, for example, local property rights, 
regulations and tax systems (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). These kinds of costs are assumed 
                                                 
2 In order to make the interpretation of the parameter more intuitive the TICP index is multiplied through 
by minus one, so that the smaller the number the higher risk. 
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to increase with distance. Distance is measured by calculating a distance between source 
and host country capitals and expressed in kilometres3. 
The corporate income tax rate affects the profitability of foreign direct investment 
and hence influences the location choices of MNEs. Few studies, however, analyse the 
effect of taxes on the location choices of foreign firms in CEECs (Bellak and Leibrecht, 
2005; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Wei, 2000). These 
studies that do include tax rates as a location choice factor in the CEECs usually use 
statutory corporate income tax rates, but these rates are not an appropriate indicator of the 
tax burden especially in the case of FDI, because they do not include all the relevant tax 
codes (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2005). The effective corporate income tax rates should be 
used, but the statutory rate is only one of the determinants of the total tax burden. For 
example, when calculating taxable profits, not all income may be included in the tax 
base, taxable income can vary due to the amount deducted from gross income, a reduced 
tax rate may be applied to a certain class of taxpayers, there might be an amount deducted 
from tax liability, or the payment of tax can be delayed. The tax base is also influenced 
by depreciation schemes, the treatment of losses and valuation of inventories amongst 
other things. In this paper, in contrast to other studies, the measure of the tax burden in 
the 12 CEECs is computed using a macroeconomic backward-looking approach, which 
calculates the effective corporate income tax rate by dividing tax payments by the 
respective country’s GDP. The approach allows a comparison between different tax 
systems, taking into account such important aspects as untaxed reserves, risk, tax 
enforcement and the treatment of losses. 
                                                 
3 The data is available from http://www.indo.com/distance
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In addition to these factors in equation (9), three other country-specific factors are 
included in the empirical model: two dummy variables, one for European Union 
membership (EUD) and another for a common border (CBD) between the investing and 
the investment receiving country. A dummy variable for a common border between the 
source and the host country is included, as it is expected that the host country is more 
likely to be chosen to locate investment if it shares the border with the source country. 
Usually countries sharing the same border have similar culture and language and stronger 
historical ties. Countries that were offered to conclude the negotiations with the European 
Council in 2002, satisfied the economic (market economy), political (democracy and 
human rights) and administrative (well-functioning institutions) criteria set at the 
Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The accession of a CEEC into EU meant free 
trade with EU member states and the adoption of Western business and legal 
environment, which provided foreign investors with confidence in success of each 
country’s reforms. As a result, the parameter of EU dummy variable is expected to have a 
positive sign.  
Although, unemployment is not important for the individual firm’s profit 
function, it may still be of significance at the country level as an indicator of labour 
market flexibility. Countries with high local demand for goods and services and high 
labour market flexibility are likely to face relatively low rates of unemployment, which 
may encourage firms to invest in a particular host country. On the other hand, a high 
unemployment rate may mean that although it is easy to recruit labour, there is low 
demand locally and labour market rigidities. The impact of unemployment, , on the 
investment location decision is therefore strictly ambiguous.  
cu
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Industry-level wage rates, , are included as a proxy for the average costs of 
firms and they implicitly assume that workers are not fully mobile across sectors, at least 
in the short run. The profitability of the firm investing abroad is expected to be higher if 
the labour costs are lower in the chosen country than in the rest of the destination 
countries, so the coefficient on labour costs is expected to have a negative sign.  
csw
These country-specific factors are represented by the vector  in Section 2. The 
empirical counterpart of that vector of variables is therefore summarised as follows, 
together with the theoretically expected signs above the variables: 
cx
],,,,,,,,[ cscccccdcc wOPENCBDEUDuTQGx
−+++±−+−−= τ     (10) 
The second group of variables to influence the FDI location decision are those 
which vary with the sector (industry) as well as by country. Industry-specific explanatory 
variables also include industry dummy variables for scale-intensive (SCA), science-based 
(SCI) and traditional sectors (TRA). Scale-intensive sectors include typical oligopolistic, 
large firm industries, with high capital intensity, extensive economies of scale and 
learning, high technical and managerial complexity, for example, automobiles, aircrafts, 
chemicals, petrol and coal products, shipbuilding, industrial chemicals, drugs and 
medicines, petrol refineries, non-ferrous metals and railroad equipment (Midelfart-
Knarvik et al., 2000). Science-based sectors, on the other hand, are characterised by 
innovative activities directly linked to high R&D expenditures, for example, fine 
chemicals, electronic components, telecommunications, and aerospace (Midelfart-
Knarvik et al., 2000). Traditional (supplier-dominated) sectors include such industries as 
textiles, clothing, furniture, leather and shoes, ceramics, and the simplest metal products.  
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It is expected that firms operating in science-based industries will employ more 
skilled labour and pay higher wages that reflect this skill premium. This effect is captured 
by the interaction term wcs×SCI. In contrast to the science-based industries, which are 
characterised by high-specialisation and risk, traditional sectors that produce every-day-
life products are less vulnerable to changes in demand and therefore, they are less risky. 
As a result, firms investing in traditional sectors are less likely to be discouraged to invest 
in countries characterised by higher risk, as higher country-level risk is outweighed with 
lower risk at the industry-level. This effect is captured by the interaction term Gc×TRA. 
Finally, scale-intensive industries, characterized by large efficiency seeking firms, are 
more likely to be sensitive to higher corporate income tax rate, as higher revenue means 
higher taxes paid in absolute terms. The sensitivity of larger firms to the corporate 
income tax rate is captured by the interaction term Tc×SCA. 
As a result equation (11) contains three interaction terms between country-level 
and industry-level dummy variables, such that: 
      (11) ],,[
+−+ ×××= TRAGSCATSCIwv cccscs
It is important to control for firm’s size and profitability, as country-specific 
factors vary for firms of different characteristics. The firm-level variables include the 
turnover of the firm as a proxy for its size ( ) and earnings before interest and tax as a 
proxy for profitability ( ). Firms of different sizes and profitability are likely to possess 
different resources and capabilities (Dean et al., 1998). Small firms are frequently 
characterised by speed, flexibility and niche-filling capabilities due to their structural 
simplicity and faster decision making, entrepreneurial-orientation and less risk aversion 
is
ie
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(Woo, 1987). As a result, smaller firms may respond quicker to the dynamics of the 
specific industry environment. On the other hand, large firms, which are usually more 
profitable, are able to acquire a larger market share by exploiting scale economies, 
bargaining power, patents and financial resources to deal with shocks and business 
downturns (Dean et al., 1998). Large firms are therefore expected to dominate scale-
intensive sectors and to be more sensitive to market size and efficiency considerations, 
while small and medium enterprises prefer to invest in countries with strong historical 
ties and similar culture and language. As a result, larger firms are more likely to invest in 
more remote countries, and the interaction term si×τcd,, is therefore expected to have a 
positive sign. 
The degree of internationalisation is largely determined by the size of the firm, 
since larger firms tend to be more profitable and productive and higher productivity 
increases the probability of setting up a foreign affiliate (Buch et al., 2005). More 
profitable firms are also expected to prefer countries with lower unemployment rates. 
Workers who stay unemployed for some time, may loose their skills, as a result, more 
profitable firms are able to pay higher wages to attract workers from other firms. If 
workers are attracted from different industries, more profitable firms have more resources 
for the training of the new workers. This effect is captured by interaction term eic×uc. 
Thus 
        (12) ],[
+− ××= cdicicci sue τφ
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 Equations (10), (11) and (12) indicate the specific variables that make up the 
matrix and which, in turn determine the overall level of profit of the firm in each 
location, according to equation (1).  
cisz
 
4. Estimation Results  
The MNL model4 is applied sequentially combining all the three levels of data. 
Specification 1 in Table 2, uses just one layer of data (country-level); specification 2 adds 
a variable that does not only vary among countries but also among industries; 
specification 3 augments the model with interaction terms between industry dummies and 
country-level variables; and finally, in specification 4, interaction terms are added 
between firm-level and country-level variables5. The results reported in Table 2 are 
consistent across all specifications of the model, with all coefficients of consistent 
magnitudes, correctly signed and statistically significant (except the EU membership 
dummy) predominantly at the one per cent level. The preferred model in Table 2 is 
specification 4, which has the best goodness of fit statistics as shown in the final three of 
the table, with all variables except one statistically significant at the one per cent 
confidence interval. This is consistent with the maintained hypothesis of this paper, that 
all three-levels of data are important in informing the FDI location decision.  
                                                 
4 The model was estimated using Limdep 8 Nlogit 3 software. 
5 Since country-level variables do not vary among the decision-makers they cannot be identified separately 
from the alternative specific constants (ASCs). As a result, either country-level variables or ASCs have to 
be excluded. As the reason for estimating the model is to measure the effect of a change in a particular 
characteristic on the probability of choosing a particular alternative, ASCs are excluded and it is therefore 
assumed that all relevant characteristics are included in the model. This procedure of dropping the ASCs is 
very common in environmental economics (see, for example, O’Hara, 2006). 
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Specification 4 shows that the coefficients for the GDP of the investment 
receiving country, , the distance between investing and investment receiving countries 
τ
cQ
cd, and the dummy variable for common border between the host and the source 
countries are of expected signs and highly significant. This indicates that the bigger the 
host country and the closer it is to the source country, the more likely it to be chosen by 
MNEs to locate investment. Positive and statistically significant coefficient of the dummy 
variable for common border indicates that a host country sharing a common border with a 
source country is more likely to be chosen to locate investment than a country, which 
does not have a common border with the investing country. A negative and statistically 
significant parameter for unemployment rate indicates that investing firms prefer to 
invest in countries with lower unemployment rates, possibly reflecting more flexible 
labour markets. Finally, a positive and statistically significant parameter on the variable 
Open, and negative and statistically significant parameters on variables Tc (Tax) and Gc 
(Risk) indicate that foreign firms are discouraged to invest in countries with less liberal 
trade regimes, higher corporate income tax rates and higher risk. The parameter of 
dummy variable EUD appears to be statistically insignificant indicating that the offer for 
accession countries to conclude the negotiations with the European Council in 2002 is 
less important than the gradual, long-term process of integration of accession countries 
into the EU. The parameter of the wage variable is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that investors in CEECs also search for a relatively cheap labour force.  
The interaction terms between country-level and industry-level variables appear 
to be statistically significant: the interaction term between the effective corporate income 
tax rate in the investment receiving country and the dummy variable for scale intensive 
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industries Tc×SCA ( ); the interaction term between industry-level wage in the 
investing receiving country and the dummy variable for science-based sectors w
ScaleTax×
sc×SCI 
( ) and the interaction term between risk in the investment receiving 
country and the dummy variable for traditional sectors G
ScienceWage ×
c×TRA, ( ). The 
negative and statistically significant parameter of interaction term T
TraditRisk ×
c×SCA implies that 
firms operating in scale-intensive industries, characterized by large efficiency seeking 
firms, are more likely to be sensitive to higher corporate income tax rate, as higher 
revenue means higher taxes paid in absolute terms. The positive and statistically 
significant interaction term wsc×SCI indicates that firms, operating in science-based 
industries will employ relatively more skilled-labour, as compared to firms from 
traditional sectors and as a result, will be ready to pay higher wages, which reflect skill 
premium. The positive and statistically significant interaction term Gc×TRA may be 
interpreted as showing that firms operating in traditional sectors are less likely to be 
discouraged from locating their investment in countries characterised by higher risk. 
Furthermore, higher risk at the country level may be offset by the lower risk at the 
industry level, as traditional sectors on average are likely to be less risky than scale-
intensive industries and, especially, science-based sectors. 
The positive and statistically significant interaction term si× τcd ( ) 
indicates that in contrast to small firms, which have a preference for locations close to 
their home base and which prefer to invest in countries with strong historical 
relationships and low cultural and linguistic barriers, large efficiency-seeking firms are 
less likely to be discouraged from investing in countries with bigger cultural and 
linguistic differences and weaker historical ties, in order to minimize the costs of entering 
ceDisSize tan×
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a foreign market. As a result, larger firms are more likely to invest in the more remote 
countries. The negative parameter for ei×uc ( )Pr Unemplofits ×  suggests that more 
profitable foreign investors can afford to pay higher wages to attract workers from other 
firms. The statistically significant interaction terms show, that even though FDI to the 
CEECs can be explained by a number of country-level variables, the responsiveness of 
FDI to those variables differs across sectors and firms of different sizes and profitability.  
The outcome of the model estimation process is a set of choice probabilities for 
each investor, which can be summed up over all alternatives in order to obtain shares for 
each alternative. The only information that the estimated parameters of a choice model 
reveal is the sign and significance of the effect of the associated variable on the choice 
probabilities.  In order to measure the effect of the change of a variable on the change in 
the probability of choosing a particular alternative, direct elasticities of the choice 
probabilities with respect to a chosen attribute can be calculated6. The calculations by 
NLOGIT software are based on the point elasticity, which is useful for interpreting small 
changes in the level of an attribute. 
Potentially there are three ways to aggregate elasticities: to use a sample mean of 
estimated probability for choosing an alternative; to calculate the elasticity for each 
individual decision maker and weight each elasticity with the decision maker’s associated 
choice probability (probability weighted sample enumeration); or to calculate the 
elasticity for each individual decision maker without weighting it (averaged over 
observations, called naive pooling). Louviere et al., (2000) argue that naïve aggregation 
fails to recognize the contribution of each observation to the choice outcome of each 
                                                 
6 The cross elasticities which measure the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in a competing alternative have no 
sensible interpretation in the case of the MNL model.  
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alternative and advise using the probability weighted sample enumeration (PWSE) to 
calculate elasticities for discrete choice models, to avoid the problem where a single 
observation has a very small estimated probability, making the estimated elasticity of that 
observation very large, resulting in misspecification.  
Table 3 reports the investment share of each alternative location and the estimated 
PWSE elasticities for GDP, tax and wage variables. The second column of Table 3 shows 
that Bulgaria represents almost 4 percent of the investment choices, while Poland was 
chosen just over 30 percent of the time. Interestingly these shares are greater for Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary - the largest economies and the most advanced in terms 
of the transition towards the western European economies. In contrast Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Ukraine have some of the lowest shares, showing that these countries have yet to 
receive as much FDI from the west as the former group of countries, whose transition 
was somewhat swifter and accession into the EU earlier.  
The direct elasticities for GDP, tax and wage attributes on each of the twelve 
alternatives are also shown in Table 3. It is expected that an increase in market size 
would make the location more attractive for foreign investors. For example, one percent 
increase in Bulgaria’s GDP, increases the probability of selecting the country as an 
investment location by about 0.2 percent. The estimated GDP elasticities are inelastic for 
all location alternatives, except for Poland. A higher corporate income tax rate is 
expected to have a negative effect on the investment location choices of foreign firms. 
For example, the rise in the corporate income tax rate by one per cent in Hungary will 
decrease the probability of selecting the country to locate investment by about one per 
cent. Although the estimated tax elasticities are inelastic for most countries, the 
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exceptions being Croatia, and perhaps Slovenia, which has an absolute value close to 
unity, the tax elasticities are in general larger than the corresponding GDP elasticities for 
most countries the exceptions being Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland. This 
suggests that a unit rise in the effective tax rate is a more important determinant of FDI 
location than a similar unit increase in GDP. This is perhaps reflects the fact that 
multinational corporation prefer to locate in lower tax countries and to supply 
neighbouring higher tax countries by exporting.  
Higher wage rates in the host country are also expected to have a negative effect 
on the investment location choices of MNEs. The estimated WAGE elasticities are, 
however, highly inelastic for all 12 CEECs with the exception of Slovenia. Although 
many previous studies investigating the investment choices of MNEs in the CEECs have 
concluded that lower wage rates in the CEECs is one of the principal factors attracting 
foreign investment, the calculated impact elasticities imply that the FDI decision is not 
very responsive to wage changes. For example, a decrease in the wage rate in Bulgaria by 
1 percent will increase the probability of selecting Bulgaria as an investment location 
only by 0.2 percent. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, using a MNL model and a multi-level data set, we have shown that the 
investment location decision with respect to FDI in the CEECs is complex and depends 
on country, industry and firm-specific characteristics. Local market size together with the 
institutional, legal and political environment, corporate income tax rate and liberal trade 
regimes appear to be the main factors influencing where MNEs locate in the CEECs. The 
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responsiveness of FDI in CEECs to country-level variables, however, differs across 
sectors and across firms of different sizes and profitability. For example, the more 
profitable MNEs are willing to pay higher wages in order to attract workers from other 
firms, while larger efficiency-seeking firms are less likely to be discouraged to invest in 
countries with weaker historical ties and larger cultural and language differences. MNEs 
operating in science-based industries are more likely to invest in a CEEC with higher 
wage rates, as higher wages reflect the skills, while firms operating in scale intensive 
industries are more likely to be discouraged to invest in countries with higher corporate 
income tax rates. Firms operating in traditional sectors are less likely to be discouraged to 
invest countries associated with higher risk. Firms operating in scale-intensive industries, 
characterized by large efficiency seeking firms, are more likely to be sensitive to higher 
corporate income tax rate, as higher revenue means higher taxes paid in absolute terms. 
These results cast some doubt on the robustness of earlier empirical studies that 
focused on either macroeconomic or microeconomic features of the FDI location 
decision. In particular, they show that although a large number of country and firm 
characteristics are statistically significant, quantitatively the FDI location decision is not 
very responsive to the country level variables such as GDP, the tax burden or wage rates, 
in the receiving countries. One explanation for the small size of the estimated impact 
effects may be because there are no dynamic effects in this model, which may turn out to 
be important when cumulated over a long period of time and which can not be captured 
by this data set. Alternatively, it could be that the FDI decision is largely a strategic 
decision, rather than a strictly economic decision and that the decision reached is part of 
the MNE global, rather than regional strategy. In either case the need for more 
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disaggregated data over a longer period of time is likely to be necessary to further 
enhance these results. 
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Table 1: List of variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Choicec a CEEC, in which firm n chooses to locate its 
investment over the period of time from 1997 to 
2003 (it gets the value of 1 if the country received 
investment and 0 otherwise) 
Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
database 
Distance distance between the capital cities of the source 
country d and the host country c in kilometres 
http://www.indo.com/distance/
GDPc GDP of the host country c averaged over the 
period of time from 1997 to 2003 
IFS 
Riskc Corruption perception index of the host country c 
averaged over the period of time from 1997 to 
2003 
Transparency International 
Unemplc unemployment rate of country c (percentage per 
annum) averaged over the period of time from 
1997 to 2003 
IFS 
Taxc effective corporate income tax rate in country c 
averaged over the period of time from 1997 to 
2003 
Calculated using data from 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators
Openessc Exports as a percentage of its GDP averaged 
over the period of time from 1997 to 2003 
 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank)  
Bordercd a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if both 
source country d and host country c share a 
border, and 0 otherwise 
constructed 
EUc dummy variable that takes value 1 if country c 
was offered to conclude the accession negotiations 
in October 2002, based on the compliance with 
the Copenhagen criteria, and 0 otherwise 
constructed 
Scales dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s 
is a scale-scale industry, and 0 otherwise 
constructed 
Sciences dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s 
is a science-based industry, and 0 otherwise 
constructed 
Tradits dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s 
is a traditional industry, and 0 otherwise 
constructed 
Wagec hourly wage rates in the industry s in the country c 
averaged over the period from 1997 to 2003 
International Labour 
Organisation 
Sizen turnover of the investing firm i in Euros in most 
recent years 
Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
database 
Earningsn earnings before interest and taxes of the investing 
firm i in Euros in most recent years 
Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
database 
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Table 2: Specifications of Multinomial Logit Model 
 
  1 2 3 4 
GDP 1.4485* 1.4652* 1.4794* 1.4922* 
 {15.913} {17.474} {17.557} {17.698} 
Distance -1.6348* -1.6652* -1.6760* -1.7760* 
 {-16.797} {-17.155} {-17.202} {-17.377} 
Border 0.3343* 0.3605* 0.3526* 0.3692* 
 (2.711} (2.915} (2.850} (2.981} 
Openness 0.0153* 0.0097* 0.0098* 0.0101* 
 {4.230} {2.637} {2.662} {2.756} 
Risk -0.1709* -0.3795* -0.4112* -0.3941* 
 {-2.776} {-6.056} {-6.430} {-6.157} 
Return on capital 0.0197* 0.0195* 0.0192* 0.0185* 
 {2.310} {8.068} {7.928} {7.579} 
Unemployment -0.0464* -0.0331* -0.0326* -0.0302* 
 {-4.231} {-2.967} {-2.914} {-2.599} 
EU -0.0644    
 {-0.403}    
Tax -0.0605* -0.0586* -0.0493* -0.0491* 
 {-4.413} {-4.978} {-3.940} {-3.905} 
Wage  -0.3189* -0.3490* -0.3290* 
  {-5.986} {-6.199} {-5.859} 
Risk×Tradit   0.1921** 0.2039* 
   {1.940} {2.047} 
Tax× Scale   -0.0686* -0.0601* 
   {-2.448} {-2.174} 
Wage× Science   0.4331* 0.4111* 
   {3.387} {3.211} 
Prof Unempl ×    -0.6560*** 
    {-1.871} 
Size×Distance    2.3668* 
    {3.577} 
Log-likelihood -2466.636 -2445.853 -2437.061 -2428.664 
Chi-squared 331.902 373.468 391.052 407.846 
Pseudo-R2 0.0630 0.0710 0.0743 0.0775 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 10 percent level 
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Table 3: Fraction (percentage) of investors that invest in a particular country, direct 
elasticities for GDP and TAX attributes 
 
Countries Fractions Elasticities for 
GDP attribute 
Elasticities for 
TAX attribute 
Elasticities for 
the WAGE 
attribute 
Bulgaria 3.84 0.206 -0.783 -0.231 
Croatia 2.54 0.317 -1.205 -0.237 
Czech Republic 15.21 0.824 -0.617 -0.520 
Estonia 7.93 0.081 -0.678 -0.479 
Hungary 12.92 0.747 -0.890 -0.513 
Latvia 3.76 0.123 -0.554 -0.488 
Lithuania 6.13 0.188 -0.609 -0.497 
Poland 30.17 1.817 -0.571 -0.530 
Romania 8.01 0.563 -0.587 -0.275 
Slovakia 4.33 0.337 -0.846 -0.57 
Slovenia 2.21 0.308 -0.979 -1.295 
Ukraine 2.94 0.549 -0.614 -0.197 
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